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 “ Alles oder Nichts ” ? The outer 
boundaries of the German 
citizenship debate 
 Enik o˝  Horváth and  Ruth  Rubio-Marín * 
 In this article we explore how constitutionally enshrined and historically conditioned con-
ceptions of membership in Germany have continued to frame citizenship debates over the 
last two decades. These debates have been revived both by domestic developments, such as 
mass migration, and by external factors, such as European integration. The larger question 
examined is the extent to which, at least in the European Union, conceptions of  “ citizen-
ship ” now evolve in reaction to  “ internal ” or  “ external ” factors, and how the balance of such 
factors shapes the outcome of particular changes in policy. In our inquiry, we look ﬁ rst at the 
evolution of policy on access to full citizenship in Germany and then at that of its attendant rights 
and obligations. Finally, we draw certain general conclusions from the German example for 
European integration and for possible scenarios of coexistence of the national and European 
citizenship models. 
 1.  Introduction 
 The speciﬁ c bond of  “ citizenship ” in a polity is distinguished by both the rules of access 
to citizenship status and the scope and quality of the rights this status entails within a 
given territory. It is for this reason that citizenship has been described, rightly, as  “ inti-
mately linked to the ideas of individual entitlement on the one hand and of attach-
ment to a particular community on the other. ” 1 Indeed, the speciﬁ c solutions devised 
to questions of access and rights deﬁ ne the character of the political entity. 
 The ideal of  “ national citizenship ” , born of the French and American revolutions, 
whereby all the members of the political community bounded by the borders of the 
 *  Email:  Eniko.Horvath@eui.eu ;  Ruth.Rubio@eui.eu . Enik o˝ Horváth practices law in Paris, France, with 
a focus on international arbitration and international law. Dr. Horváth completed her Ph.D. at the 
European University Institute in 2006. Ruth Rubio Marín is Professor of Public Comparative Law at the 
European University Institute. 
 1  Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman,  Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory ,  in 
T HEORIZING C ITIZENSHIP 283, 283 (Ronald Beiner ed., State Univ. of New York Press 1995). 
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state — and only they — were to have equal rights and duties and an equal stake in 
decisions regarding matters of that state, has been transformed in various ways in 
domestic legal orders as a result of particular historical and social circumstances. 
In like manner,  “ contingent historical advantages and accidental inﬂ uences from 
the past ” 2 are reﬂ ected in constitutional laws. Nevertheless, despite such divergence, 
access to the full membership designated by citizenship in modern democratic states 
has been, historically, a corollary of nationality, an ongoing legal tie between individ-
ual and state for international law purposes. Thus,  “ while  ‘ nationality ’ [  . . . ] deﬁ ne[d] 
the bond between an individual and a state on the international level,  ‘ citizenship ’ 
determine[d] the internal content of that bond, ” 3 in particular, the scope and quality 
of rights in the territory of the state. 
 Since nationality — in particular, in its function as a gateway to citizenship — is gen-
erally conceived of as a status that also entails social belonging, it serves to demar-
cate clear boundaries between  “ ins ” and  “ outs. ” 4 As the German Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht or Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has noted, this status  “ cannot be 
parceled out gradually, but [instead] always represents a decision about  ‘ all or noth-
ing ’ for the individual. ” 5 The maintenance of social boundaries takes place through 
the organization and reorganization of both the bases and the content of the claimed 
distinctiveness that sets the particular political community apart. With a view to such 
distinctiveness, broad categories of persons are designated, each with a particular 
set of relations to the state:  “ nationals, ”  “ Union citizens, ”  “ third-country nationals, ” 
 “ aliens, ” and so forth. 
 However, historical norms regarding membership determine the normative and 
legislative outlines of any future development in this context; they do so by setting 
the standard against which all future evolution is measured. 6 Such path dependency, 
which determines who is an in- or outsider today, 7 is an obvious matter, perhaps, but 
important to note, given the force of the status quo as the ostensible outcome of past 
consensus. This is not to say that policy shifts are impossible, just that a radical depar-
ture from existing approaches is improbable, particularly in light of the boundaries set 
by constitutional discourse. 
 At the same time, the ideal of a uniﬁ ed national citizenship has rarely, if ever, sur-
vived practical implementation — given that women and racial minorities have been 
systematically excluded from full membership — and even the model itself has been 
 2  J OHN R AWLS , J USTICE  AS F AIRNESS : A R ESTATEMENT 16 (Erin Kelly ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2001). 
 3  E NIK ő H ORVÁTH , M ANDATING I DENTITY : C ITIZENSHIP , K INSHIP L AWS AND P LURAL N ATIONALITY IN THE E UROPEAN U NION 
4 (Kluwer Law International 2008). 
 4  Ulrich K. Preuß,  Problems of a Concept of European Citizenship , 1 E UR . L.J. 267, 269 (1995). Approach-
es to citizenship as practice, which entails an engagement with other individuals and groups, and an 
acknowledgement of commonality or commitment to the basic principles underlying the given political 
community, will not be discussed here. 
 5  “ [ . . . ] er nicht graduell austariert werden kann, sondern für den Betroffenen immer eine Entscheidung 
über  ‘ Alles oder Nichts ’ darstellt. ” BVerfG May 24, 2006, 2 BvR 669/04, para 75. Cases decided since 
1998 are available at:  http :// www . bverfg . de . 
 6  H ORVÁTH ,  supra note 3, at 10. 
 7  Id. 
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increasingly disaggregated in Europe in recent years. Indeed, access to full citizenship 
generally still remains the ﬂ ip side of nationality; however, many citizenship rights — 
 though in most cases not political rights nor a guaranteed right to remain in the ter-
ritory of the state in question — are, in fact, granted to non-nationals, such as Union 
citizens and other permanent residents. On the other hand, certain citizenship rights, 
including the right not to be removed from one’s country of nationality, may be denied 
nationals in speciﬁ c circumstances. 
 In this article we explore how domestic systems restructure the  “ national citizen-
ship ” model in different ways on the basis of distinct historical and social tradi-
tions as these are reﬂ ected in the constitutional norms of the state. The example of 
Germany demonstrates how a particular historical and social model continues to 
frame citizenship debates revived by domestic developments, such as mass migration, 
but also how external factors, such as European law, in particular, can inﬂ uence 
the same. The larger question examined here is the extent to which, at least in the 
European Union (EU), conceptions of citizenship evolve in reaction to internal or 
external factors, and how the balance of such factors shapes the outcome of particu-
lar changes in policy. In our inquiry, we look ﬁ rst at the evolution of access to full 
citizenship, then at its attendant rights and obligations. Finally, we draw some general 
conclusions from the German example for European integration. 
 2.  Constitutional conceptions of membership in Germany 
 When looking at German conceptions of membership, one must take into account 
several parallel — albeit interdependent — approaches, all of which are present in the 
German Basic Law (Grundgesetz [GG]) of 1949. 8 These approaches form the back-
ground against which the German national citizenship model is being challenged 
by both domestic developments (for example, mass migration) and external ones 
(namely, European integration). 
 In the ﬁ rst place, the Basic Law contains a robust civic conception of citizenship 
( Staatsbürgerschaft ), as reﬂ ected in GG Preamble, 9 articles 20(2) 10 and 146, 11 and 
embodied in the notion of a sovereign people or demos ( Staatsvolk ) as the foundation 
for German sovereignty in FCC decisions. 12 
 8  Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, as published in Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Glieder-
ungsnummer 100-101, last amended by the Act of July 29, 2009, BGBl. I at 2248,  available at 
 http :// www . gesetze - im - internet . de / bundesrecht / gg / gesamt . pdf . 
 9  “ Im Bewußtsein seiner Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen [ . . . ] hat sich das Deutsche Volk 
kraft seiner verfassungsgebenden Gewalt dieses Grundgesetz gegeben. Die Deutschen in den Ländern 
[  . . . ] haben in freier Selbstbestimmung die Einheit und Freiheit Deutschlands vollendet. Damit gilt dieses 
Grundgesetz für das gesamte Deutsche Volk. ” GG Preamble. 
 10  “ Alle Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus. Sie wird vom Volke in Wahlen und Abstimmungen [ . . . ] 
ausgeübt. ” GG art. 20(2). 
 11  “ Dieses Grundgesetz, das nach Vollendung der Einheit und Freiheit Deutschlands für das gesamte 
deutsche Volk gilt, verliert seine Gültigkeit an dem Tage, an dem eine Verfassung in Kraft tritt, die von 
dem deutschen Volke in freier Entscheidung beschlossen worden ist. ” GG art. 146. 
 12  See, e.g, BVerfGE 2, 266 (277); BVerfGE 83, 37 (51 et seq.); BVerfGE 89, 155 (186). 
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 Over and beyond this primary civic construction of membership, however, two 
additional approaches are also present in GG article 116(1), which deﬁ nes who is 
 “ German ” for the purposes of the Basic Law with reference to statutory provisions. 13 
The categories of people who are considered German are those who, on the one hand, 
hold German nationality ( Staatsangehörigkeit ) in accordance with the ever-evolving 
law on nationality and, on the other, those who are German- Volk refugees or expellees 
( Volkszugehörigkeit ) as well as their spouses or descendants, who have been admitted 
into German territory in accordance with the Federal Law on Expellees and Refugees, 14 
as discussed further below. 
 The reliance on an ethnocultural understanding of the German (cultural) nation 
( Volkszugehörigkeit ) in GG article 116(1) is unusual, and exempliﬁ es how a particular 
historical circumstance may modify or distort the national citizenship model. Never-
theless, given that both the civic conception and the  “ open ” conception of member-
ship—to be ﬁ lled out by the statutory deﬁ nition of nationality—coexist in the Basic 
Law together with this ethnocultural approach, it would be wrong to classify, as is 
often done, the German constitutional model of national citizenship as a paradigmati-
cally ethnic one. In fact, the FCC has gone out of its way to clarify that the German 
nation is a purely civic construct for constitutional purposes. Thus, any reference to the 
 “ German nation ” is to be understood as a synonym only for the  “ German  Staatsvolk ” 
rather than as shorthand for a  “ consciousness of linguistic and cultural unity present 
in the population. ” 15 
 On the other hand, the reference in the same article of the Basic Law to nationality 
is quite commonplace and fully in line with the two constituent parts of the national 
citizenship model discussed above. Indeed, the relationship between citizenship and 
nationality has been analyzed often by the FCC and relied on as a fundamental 
linkage constitutive of the German political community. As the Court has repeat-
edly noted, the function of nationality is to serve as the primary means by which to 
determine who will constitute the  Staatsvolk . 16 In other words, nationality serves to 
 13  “ Deutscher im Sinne dieses Grundgesetzes ist vorbehaltlich anderweitiger gesetzlicher Regelung, wer die 
deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt oder als Flüchtling oder Vertriebener deutscher Volkszugehörigkeit 
oder als dessen Ehegatte oder Abkömmling in dem Gebiete des Deutschen Reiches nach dem Stande vom 
31. Dezember 1937 Aufnahme gefunden hat. ” GG art. 116(1). 
 14  Bundesvertriebenengesetz [BVFG], May 19, 1953, BGBl I at 201. Such individuals are often referred to 
as  “ status Germans ” ( Statusdeutsche ). BVFG § 6 sets out the requirements for German  Volk -belonging, 
which include features such as descent, language, education, and culture. 
 15  “ Wir haben von der im Grundgesetz vorausgesetzten, in ihm  ‘ verankerten ’ Existenz Gesamtdeutschlands 
mit einem deutschen (Gesamt-)Staatsvolk und einer (gesamt-)deutschen Staatsgewalt auszugehen. 
Wenn heute von der  “ deutschen Nation ” gesprochen wird, die eine Klammer für Gesamtdeutschland 
sei, so ist dagegen nichts einzuwenden, wenn darunter auch ein Synonym für das  “ deutsche Staatsvolk ” 
verstanden wird [  . . . ] Versteckte sich dagegen hinter dieser neuen Formel  “ deutsche Nation ” nur noch 
der Begriff einer im Bewußtsein der Bevölkerung vorhandenen Sprach- und Kultureinheit, dann wäre 
das  rechtlich die Aufgabe einer unverzichtbaren Rechtsposition. ” BVerfGE 36, 1 (19). 
 16  See, e.g., BVerfGE 83, 37 (52). Nonetheless, the  Statusdeutsche are on an equal footing with German 
nationals as constituent of the sovereign people.  Id. at 51. 
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circumscribe a speciﬁ c collectivity, tied together through the bonds of citizenship. 17 
Nationality is  “ the legal prerequisite for an equal citizenship status, which establishes 
equal duties on the one hand but, on the other, and especially, the rights through 
the exercise of which state power acquires its legitimacy in a democracy. ” 18 As such, 
nationality carries  “ a constitutional and democratic meaning, since citizenship status 
affects the foundations of the legal order and the polity: through it — as conveyed by 
the right to vote — state power is legitimated. ” 19 For this reason, nationality must be a 
 “ reliable foundation for equal belonging, equally meaningful for the individual and for 
society. ” 20 Because it serves such a foundational role, its constitutional protection also 
carries special weight. 21 This same foundational role has also buttressed the traditional 
German view that multiple nationality is to be viewed as an anomaly, an  “ evil ” ( ein 
Übel ) to be avoided, ostensibly in the interest of both the individual and the state. 22 
 In reality, German nationality has for a long while no longer been a matter of  “ all 
or nothing, ” since many social rights traditionally identiﬁ ed as part of the citizenship 
package have been extended in past decades to permanent residents. 23 However, the 
 “ all or nothing ” approach certainly has been maintained, consciously, in the realm 
of political rights, including voting rights, and has continued to inﬂ uence access to 
the status of nationality, as multiple nationality is still shunned. Likewise, the vari-
ous alternative approaches to membership identiﬁ ed above continue to guide the 
evolution of the national citizenship model and together continue to deﬁ ne German 
responses to the question of who, exactly, the people really are. 
 3.  Access to the status of  “ German ” 
 3.1.  The constitutional framework 
 Article 116(1) of the Basic Law provides a two-pronged deﬁ nition of who is a  “ Ger-
man, ” as already indicated: German nationals, on the one hand, and refugees and 
expellees of German  Volk -origin and their spouses or descendants, admitted into 
 17  See Rolf Grawert,  Staatsvolk und Staatsangehörigkeit ,  in H ANDBUCH  DES S TAATSRECHTS : B AND II § 16, para. 16, 
20 (Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof eds., C.F. Müller 2004). 
 18  “ Die Staatsangehörigkeit ist die rechtliche Voraussetzung für den gleichen staatsbürgerlichen Status, der 
einerseits gleiche Pﬂ ichten, zum anderen und insbesondere aber auch die Rechte begründet, durch deren 
Ausübung die Staatsgewalt in der Demokratie ihre Legitimation erfährt. ” BVerfGE 83, 37 (51). 
 19  “ Die Staatsangehörigkeit als Rechtsinstitut hat über den subjektiven Gewährleistungsgehalt hi-
naus zugleich rechtsstaatliche und demokratische Bedeutung, denn der bürgerschaftliche Status bet-
rifft die konstituierenden Grundlagen der Rechtsordnung und des Gemeinwesens: Über ihn wird die 
Staatsgewalt — vermittelt über das Wahlrecht — legitimiert. ”  Id. 
 20  “ für den Einzelnen und für die Gesellschaft gleichermaßen bedeutsame [ . . . ] verlässliche Grundlage 
gleichberechtigter Zugehörigkeit. ” BVerfG Dec. 8, 2006, 2 BvR 1339/06, para. 12.  See also BVerfGE 37, 
217 (239). 
 21  BVerfG May 24, 2006, 2 BvR 669/04, para. 75. The special protection afforded nationality status is 
reﬂ ected in GG art. 16(1). 
 22  BVerfGE 37, 217 (254). For a discussion of cases and relevant doctrinal discussion, see R UTH R UBIO -M ARÍN , 
I MMIGRATION AS A D EMOCRATIC C HALLENGE 230 – 232 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). 
 23  See R UBIO -M ARÍN ,  supra note 22, at 193 – 196. 
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German territory (the so-called  Statusdeutsche ), on the other. Both groups are consid-
ered  “ German ” for constitutional purposes. 24 
 The category of  “ Volk -Germans ” is, as has been widely recognized, a remnant of 
historical circumstance, and, in particular, a response to both the division of Ger-
many into two states and the mass deportation of  Volk -Germans from their states of 
nationality after World War II. 25 Nonetheless, the ethnocultural understanding of the 
German nation it reﬂ ects has a long tradition, and remains ﬁ rmly embedded in both 
constitutional and statutory law today. 
 Thus, despite the civic conception of the German nation delineated by the FCC 
(which views citizenship primarily as a corollary of German nationality and as an afﬁ l-
iation based on equal political and civic rights for all members of the  Staatsvolk ), the 
dual-pronged approach of the Basic Law to who is  “ German ” continues to create legal 
anomalies.  Statusdeutsche , as  “ Germans, ” are considered a constitutive component of 
the sovereign German people and are granted citizenship rights — including freedom 
of assembly, freedom of association, freedom to choose a profession and so forth 26 — on 
the basis of ostensible belonging to the German ethnocultural nation and before they 
have passed through the gate of nationality. 27 Upon arrival in Germany, however, 
and despite their status as German nationals, the right of  Statusdeutsche (now, in the 
main, the so-called  “ late expatriates ” or  Spätaussiedler ) 28 to move freely within the 
country — as other Germans may do, pursuant to GG art. 11(1) — may be curtailed in 
the context of receipt of social beneﬁ ts. 29 
 The deﬁ nition of  “ German ” contained in the Basic Law and the concept of  Staatsvolk 
it underpins are not isolated, ﬁ xed categories, however, and must be capable of accom-
modating social change, if only through the safety valve of a continuously revised 
nationality law. As the head of the committee of the interior put it during discussions 
about a signiﬁ cant reform of the law on nationality in 1999,  “ the question is whether 
constitutional law can accept that its underlying foundations can also change through 
 24  GG art. 116(2) provides for the reinstatement of the nationality of individuals resident in Germany after 
May 8, 1945, and who had been stripped of that status between 1933 and 1945 on political, racial or 
religious grounds. 
 25  See BVerfGE 83, 37 (51).  See also R UBIO -M ARÍN ,  supra note 22, at 226 – 227. 
 26  See GG arts. 8, 9(1), 11, 12(1), 16(2), 33, 38 and 54(1). These are rights that the Basic Law speciﬁ cally 
reserves for Germans, as opposed to other rights that it grants to everyone. 
 27  As discussed below, since 1999 the acquisition of German nationality for  Volk -Germans who may 
immigrate to Germany (since 1993, mainly the so-called  “ late expatriates ” or  Spätaussiedler ) is automatic 
upon a certiﬁ cation of that status, thereby mitigating this anomaly as a practical matter. 
 28  See BVFG § 4, as modiﬁ ed by Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz [KfbG, Law on the Adjustment of Laws on 
the Effects of War], Dec. 21, 1992, BGBl I at 2094 for a complete deﬁ nition of  Spätaussiedler status. 
 29  BVerfG Mar. 17, 2004, 1 BvR 1266/00 (determining that the provisions of a law restricting the provision 
of social beneﬁ ts to the particular federal state [ Land ] to which expatriates and their families had been 
assigned at repatriation were constitutional in light of the large numbers of late expatriates immigrating 
to Germany and their particular needs). 
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a strengthened integration policy between nations and peoples. ” 30 As shown below, 
recent reforms have brought about changes but no fundamental modiﬁ cation in the 
constitutional approach. 
 3.2.  Statutory evolution and constitutional monitoring of boundaries 
 After several decades of only nominal amendment, the German Nationality Law 
of 1913 31 was at last signiﬁ cantly overhauled and renamed in 1999, 32 mainly in 
response both to the reality of decades of mass migration to Germany, which resulted 
in the presence of a large population of second- and third-generation non-nationals 
excluded from the political community, and to the ever-burgeoning requirements of 
European integration. The new nationality law (now called the Staatsangehörigkeits-
gesetz, or StAG), which entered into force in 2000, marked a new beginning of sorts, 
as the long-held pillars of German nationality law — for example, an exclusive reliance 
on jus sanguinis in the attribution of birthright nationality — were abandoned. The 
StAG was then reformed in 2004 33 and has since been further amended, including in 
2007. 34 
 Section 1 of the StAG today provides that a  “ German ” , for purposes of the law, is an 
individual who holds German nationality. Elsewhere, however, reference is still made 
to the nationality status of  “ Germans without German nationality, ”  35 the  Statusdeut-
sche , thereby importing the ethnocultural approach to German (cultural) nationhood 
found in the Basic Law into the nationality law. In any case, since 1999, the acquisi-
tion of German nationality is automatic upon a certiﬁ cation of late-expatriate ( Spä-
taussiedler ) status for those  Volk -Germans (generally those from the territory of the 
former U.S.S.R.) with a right to immigrate to Germany. 36 On the other hand, changes 
have been gradually introduced to gain more control over the immigration patterns 
of those with late-expatriate status. 37 
 30  “ [E]s geht [ . . . ] um die Frage, ob das Verfassungsrecht akzeptieren kann, dass sich die ihm zugrunde 
gelegten Grundlagen auch durch eine verstärkte Intergrationspolitik zwischen Nationen und Völkern 
verändern kann. ” Willfried Penner in  Protokoll über die 12. Sitzung des Innenausschusses (April 13, 1999) 
 in R EFORM  DES S TAATSANGEHÖRIGKEITSRECHTS  – D IE PARLAMENTARISCHE B ERATUNG 27, 96 (Deutscher Bundestag, 
Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit 1999). 
 31  Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz [RuStAG], July 22, 1913, RGBl 1913 at 583. 
 32  Gesetz zur Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts, July 15, 1999, BGBl I at 1618. 
 33  See H ORVÁTH ,  supra note 3 , at 250 et seq., 265 et seq. 
 34  See Fritz Sturm,  Die versteckte Novelle des Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes , 61(5) StAZ 129 (2008). 
 35  “ Deutsche [ . . . ] ohne die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit ” .  See StAG §§ 7 and 40(a). 
 36  Id. § 7. Before 1999,  Statusdeutsche were entitled to request naturalization on the basis of their admission 
into German territory. Those already in Germany as of August 1, 1999, received German nationality 
automatically pursuant to StAG § 40(a). 
 37  Political changes in the Eastern bloc resulted in a large increase in the numbers of  Statusdeutsche . 
In response, an annual quota system was established in 1993. Similarly, a language test was introduced 
in order to help prove that people claiming late-expatriate status were actually  Volk -Germans. The new 
Immigration Act of 2004 extended the requirement of proof of basic knowledge of German to the non – 
 Volk -German spouses and non – Volk -German descendants of persons with late-expatriate status intend-
ing to acquire German nationality.  See Kay Hailbronner,  Germany in A CQUISITION AND L OSS OF N ATIONALITY , 
V OLUME 2: C OUNTRY A NALYSES 213, 216 – 217 (Rainer Bauböck et al. eds., Amsterdam Univ. Press, 2006). 
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 3.2.1.  Multiple nationality and the  Optionspﬂ icht 
 An important aim of the 1999 reform of the German nationality law was to promote 
the acquisition of German nationality by migrant workers and their second- and third-
generation descendants as an essential prerequisite of their integration into German 
society. 38 Among other reforms, a jus soli regime for the children of migrants ordinar-
ily present in Germany for eight years with a valid residence permit was introduced. 39 
In addition, a less restrictive approach to multiple nationality was instituted. 
 3.2.1.1.  Multiple nationality 
 Despite heated debate, 40 the traditional principle of avoiding multiple nationality was 
ultimately maintained in the nationality law; nonetheless, the 1999 reform provided 
for a large number of statutory exceptions to the requirement that one relinquish 
one’s previous nationality before naturalization. Hitherto, many of these exceptions 
had been included only in federal guidelines. The general rule was now that an indi-
vidual was not obliged to give up her previous nationality if her state of nationality 
did not allow her to do so or allowed her to do so only under particularly difﬁ cult 
conditions, including considerable (ﬁ nancial) disadvantage. 41 In addition, the nation-
als of EU member states were allowed to retain their nationality at naturalization in 
Germany if their original state of nationality allowed German nationals to keep theirs 
at naturalization in the other member state. 
 The statutory march toward limited acceptance of multiple nationality, which 
began in 1999, has since continued, most prominently with the agreement, since 
2007, to allow Union citizens and Swiss nationals to maintain their preexisting 
nationality at naturalization, without any requirement of reciprocity in the case of 
the former. 42 Similarly, German nationals who naturalize in another EU member state 
or Switzerland (or in a state with which Germany has entered into a relevant bilateral 
agreement) may keep their German nationality. 43 
 While over half of all naturalizations now occur with permission to maintain one’s 
previous nationality as a result of one of the exceptions, 44 attempts to allow for a blan-
ket acceptance of multiple nationality — as is the case for the nationals of EU member 
states — have been regularly rejected. Similarly, attempts to extend the permissive 
stance on the maintenance of German nationality allowed to German nationals who 
naturalize in an EU member state to those who naturalize in third countries have also 
 38  Id . at 213. 
 39  StAG § 4(3). 
 40  See H ORVÁTH ,  supra note 3 , at 250 – 258, 265. 
 41  StAG § 12. 
 42  Id. § 12(2). 
 43  Id. § 25(1). 
 44  Susanne Worbs, Die Einbürgerung von Ausländern in Deutschland 26 (Bundesamt für Migration 
und Flüchtlinge, Working Paper No. 17, 2008),  available at  http :// www . bamf . de / cln_092 / nn_442016 /
 SharedDocs / Anlagen / DE / Migration / Publikationen / Forschung / WorkingPapers / wp17 - einbuergerung ,
 templateId = raw , property = publicationFile . pdf / wp17 - einbuergerung . pdf . 
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faltered. Thus, the European Union forms a privileged space for the purposes of Ger-
man nationality legislation, given that one of the main principles of access to German 
nationality — namely, that it provide a unique status — has been suspended. 
 3.2.1.2.  The  Optionspﬂ icht 
 Along with the major policy shifts ushered in by the 1999 reforms a so-called  Optionsp-
ﬂ icht (duty of choice) was also introduced. This provision requires that ﬁ rst- generation 
German nationals who have obtained nationality as a result of jus soli choose between 
their German nationality and any additional nationalities they may have (as a result 
of the jus sanguinis regime of their parents ’ state of nationality, for example). This 
choice is to be made before the individuals reach the age of twenty-three. 45 However, 
this stipulation does not apply if the additional nationalities in question are those of 
another EU member state or Switzerland. 46 
 This provision has led to an ongoing and lively debate about the constitutional-
ity of the duty of choice, including whether the requirement is discriminatory in 
light of the equality principle enshrined in GG article 3. The question also arises as 
to whether it constitutes a deprivation of German nationality under the terms of GG 
article 16(1) 47 — in which case it would be unconstitutional — or whether it should be 
viewed as an acceptable, albeit involuntary, loss of German nationality with a statu-
tory basis. 48 In light of FCC precedent regarding the revocation of nationality, and 
given the role of nationality as a reliable basis for the individual’s afﬁ liation with the 
state on the basis of equal rights, only a loss of citizenship the individual cannot avoid 
or could not reasonably be expected to avoid can be considered discriminatory. 49 
At ﬁ rst glance, the  Optionspﬂ icht is not likely to meet this standard, since the loss of 
German nationality is avoidable by a simple written declaration and proof that any 
additional nationality has been surrendered. 
 In the context of a 2006 decision relating to a series of cases brought by new German 
nationals whose nationality had been withdrawn because they had reapplied for and 
regained their previous nationality after naturalization, a chamber of the FCC, in fact, 
expressed continued support for the constitutionality of a regulation that attributed 
the loss of German nationality to the actions of the persons concerned. 50 The individu-
als in question had received German nationality before the 1999 reforms had entered 
 45  StAG § 29. Pursuant to StAG § 40(b), children under ten years of age who fulﬁ lled the requirements 
of StAG § 4(3) could apply for naturalization in the course of 2000. The ﬁ rst of these young Germans 
reached eighteen years of age in the year 2008, and will be the ﬁ rst to have to choose between their 
nationalities in accordance with the duty of choice. 
 46  Id. § 29. 
 47  “ Die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit darf nicht entzogen werden. Der Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit 
darf nur auf Grund eines Gesetzes und gegen den Willen des Betroffenen nur dann eintreten, wenn der 
Betroffene dadurch nicht staatenlos wird. ” GG art. 16(1). 
 48  See Kay Hailbronner,  Die Reform des deutschen Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts , 12 NVwZ 1273 (1999). 
 49  BVerfG May 24, 2006, 2 BvR 669/04, para. 49 – 51. 
 50  BVerfG Dec. 12, 2006, 2 BvR 1339/06, para. 13.  See also BVerfG June 22, 1990, 2 BvR 116/90, 53 NJW 
2193 (1990) . 
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into effect in January 2000, while renouncing their previous (in many cases Turkish) 
nationality. After naturalization, they had reapplied for their previous nationality and 
were eventually regranted it, albeit after the new nationality law had come into effect 
nullifying the so-called  Inlandsklausel (domestic clause) 51 that had previously provided 
a loophole for such reapplications. As a consequence, the individuals ’ new German 
nationality was revoked. In the view of the Court, given clear and foreseeable legal 
stipulations, the loss of nationality resulted from an  “ autonomous and free determina-
tion ” by the individual to act in a manner contrary to the regulation in effect. 52 
 In this context, the issue of whether the duty of choice can be truly regarded as 
an  “ autonomous and free determination ” must be considered. Although the loss of 
German nationality in the context of the  Optionspﬂ icht is avoidable in much the same 
way that it is avoidable in the context of naturalization, nonetheless, the two situations 
differ to the extent that, in the case of the former, certain young Germans are required 
to relinquish a status they had acquired as a birthright rather than in the context of an 
administrative process initiated by them, as is the case at naturalization. 
 Another pertinent question is whether the function of nationality as a reliable basis 
for  “ equal belonging ” is undermined by such a policy. In the ﬁ rst place, considering 
that young Germans with the nationality of another EU member state (or Switzerland) 
will not be forced to make this decision, one can hardly speak of true equality, since 
a clear European exception to the general rule has been introduced. However, as a 
practical matter, it is difﬁ cult to understand what would be the difference between two 
young Germans — one also a national of Turkey, the other of the Netherlands — with 
regard to a state interest in curtailing nationality, other than the supplemental status 
of Union citizen accruing to the latter. 
 Second, as a psychological matter, it is questionable whether the conditional and/or 
temporary form of citizenship the  Optionspﬂ icht implies truly can be considered either 
meaningful for the individual in question or as a means of integration. In reality, the 
requirement of choice may well create doubt with respect to membership and could 
even lead to conﬂ ict (for example, within migrant families) as individuals are forced to 
choose one nationality over another. 
 Third, in light of the evolution of Union citizenship in recent years — now  “ destined 
to be the fundamental status of nationals of the member states ” 53 — the future with-
drawal of German nationality must be considered against the background of Euro-
pean law. After all, withdrawal of German nationality from certain young Germans 
would also result in a loss of Union citizenship and its attendant rights for those whose 
 51  Pursuant to this clause (formerly RuStAG § 25), individuals resident or permanently present in Germany 
did not lose their German nationality upon acquisition of a foreign nationality on application. 
 52  BVerfG Dec. 12, 2006, 2 BvR 1339/06, para. 13. 
 53  Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001 
E.C.R. I-6193. 
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other nationality is that of a third country; however, this would not be the case for 
those individuals whose additional nationality is that of another EU member state. 54 
 As a matter of European law, nationality issues — including the regulation of the 
acquisition and loss of nationality status — remain matters for member state compe-
tence in line with customary international law; still, this competence must be exer-
cised  “ with due regard to Community law. ” 55 Thus, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has hinted in the past at the possibility that  “ depriving any person who did not 
satisfy the deﬁ nition of a national [ . . . ] of rights to which that person might be enti-
tled under Community law, ” once those rights had arisen, may be problematic under 
European law. 56  
 Though there have been renewed, ongoing calls to abolish the  Optionspﬂ icht , as well 
as various new draft nationality laws recognizing multiple nationality submitted to 
the German parliament, 57 this provision of the StAG looks set to remain for now. Since 
the ﬁ rst individuals required to choose will have encountered this option in 2008, the 
issue is once again high on the political agenda. 
 The evolution of views concerning the conditions for gaining and maintaining 
access to German nationality is interesting on several accounts. Although the possibil-
ity of multiple nationality is still not embraced unconditionally, the general principle 
of avoidance has clearly weakened. Indeed, in 2008 the Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
(Federal Administrative Court) (FAC) noted that the introduction of a limited accept-
ance for multiple nationality in 1999 and the European exception, in its present form, 
in 2007 have rendered the public interest in avoiding multiple nationality relative, and 
shifted the balance in favor of the individual’s interest in keeping her previous nation-
ality in the context of requests for an authorization to retain one’s existing nationality 
at naturalization ( Beibehaltungsgenehmigung ). 58 This turn of events is especially nota-
ble in light of the 2006 decision of the FCC discussed above, which took a stand for the 
 54  H ORVÁTH ,  supra note 3 , at 262.  See also Gerard-René de Groot,  Towards a European Nationality Law , 8(3) 
E LECTRONIC J. C OMP . L. (2004) (discussing possible Community law limitations on the loss of member state 
nationality at § 4(c)),  available at  http :// www . ejcl . org / 83 / art83 - 4 . html . 
 55  Case C-369/90, Mario Vicente Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, 1992 
E.C.R. I-4239.  See also Final Act of the Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191/1), 
Declaration (No. 2) on nationality of a Member State. 
 56  Case C-192/99, The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Manjit Kaur, 2001 
E.C.R. I-1237 (determining that the United Kingdom had been entitled to redesignate in a 1982 declara-
tion the categories of its citizens to be regarded as its nationals for the purposes of Community law, in 
modiﬁ cation of a 1972 declaration made when the country acceded to the European Communities). As 
the ECJ noted,  “ adoption of that declaration did not have the effect of depriving any person who did not 
satisfy the deﬁ nition of a national of the United Kingdom of rights to which that person might be entitled 
under Community law. The consequence was rather that such rights never arose in the ﬁ rst place for 
such a person. ”  Id. at para. 25. In the German context, however, such rights will have arisen. 
 57  See BTDrucks 16/5107 (prepared by the Bundesrat) and BTDrucks 16/2650 (prepared by Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen). 
 58  BVerwG Apr. 10, 2008, 5 C 28.07, para. 21 – 22,  available at  http :// www . bverwg . de . 
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constitutionality of a  “ statutory regulation, which links the loss of [German] nation-
ality to the voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality by application. ” 59 Overall 
then, this evolution is likely to exempt ever more migrants from the requirement of 
relinquishing their previous nationality, rendering naturalization more appealing 
and thus helping to ensure that migrants will not remain excluded from the German 
body politic. 
 Also interesting is the evolution of the European exception in the context of a gen-
eral avoidance of multiple nationality, including through the  Optionspﬂ icht . Unlike 
some of the developments discussed below, which have resulted from the implemen-
tation of European law, the present European exception was not a direct reaction to 
any such requirements. Rather, the European exception in this context seems to have 
been born of a general view within Germany — also reﬂ ected in the nationality regu-
lations of other EU member states — that the incorporation of Union citizens into the 
national community should be facilitated. Indeed, the FAC noted in 2004 that, with a 
view to European integration, a stronger incentive to acquire German nationality was 
necessary for Union citizens, since such individuals had little need or interest in the 
acquisition of German nationality when their right to live and work in Germany was 
guaranteed through European law. 60 Through this approach, however, a clear demar-
cation is created between persons from the European Union and the rest of the world, 
at least for nationality purposes, with a different set of applicable rules. This demar-
cation is inexplicable from either the point of view of an ethnocultural conception of 
German membership (since Union citizens do not necessarily have German ancestors 
or any particular link to German culture) or as a matter of singular attachment (since 
Union citizens are no different from other migrants as concerns the maintenance of 
a unique tie to Germany). Rather, this approach seems to be an example of how the 
constitutionally enshrined margin of discretion granted to the legislator to reform the 
nationality law can accommodate social change. In this case, the change reﬂ ects the 
symbolic secondary effects of Union citizenship, as it gives concrete form to the incre-
mental transformation of conceptions of membership within the European Union. 61 
 3.2.2.  Naturalization and integration requirements 
 As noted above, one of the main conceptual shifts embodied in the 1999 nationality 
law reform was a general facilitation of naturalization, with the understanding that 
naturalization by permanent residents should no longer be an exception but the rule, 
as a matter of public interest. 62 Accordingly, discretionary regulations were replaced 
 59  “ gesetzliche Regelung, die den Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit an den freiwilligen, antragsgemäßen 
Erwerb einer ausländischen Staatsangehörigkeit knüpft. ” BVerfG Dec. 8, 2006, 2 BvR 1339/06, para. 13. 
 60  BVerwG Apr. 20, 2004, 1 C 13.03,  available at  http :// www . bverwg . de . 
 61  See H ORVÁTH ,  supra note 3 , at 115 – 116, 126 – 128. 
 62  Hailbronner,  supra note 37, at 213. This change in the nationality law is said to be reﬂ ective of a change 
in the perception of migration, as the initial assumption that the migrant workers recruited in the early 
1970s would eventually return to their home countries has been abandoned.  Id . at 216. 
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icon/article-abstract/8/1/72/682629
by UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA user
on 08 June 2018
 84   I • CON  8 (2010),  72 – 93 
by an entitlement-based system. Also, the previous ﬁ fteen-year habitual-and-lawful 
residence requirement gave way to an eight-year requirement. Additional require-
ments for naturalization included a declaration of loyalty to the free and democratic 
constitutional order and possession of a regular residence permit or freedom of move-
ment as a Union citizen. In addition, the applicant had to provide evidence of the abil-
ity to earn a living without relying on social welfare assistance, as well as the absence 
of a criminal record and the renunciation of any previous nationality. 
 Interestingly, this opening of the naturalization gateway has coincided with ever-
stricter cultural integration requirements. As a ﬁ rst step, the 1999 reforms introduced 
a provision whereby inadequate knowledge of the German language or any factual 
indication that the individual supported or had supported efforts aimed at under-
mining the Basic Law or the state were grounds to refuse naturalization. The 2004 
amendments, in turn, introduced what is now StAG sec. 10(3), whereby the usual 
waiting period of eight years for naturalization may be shortened to seven years in 
the case of successful completion of a voluntary integration course. Since the 2007 
StAG amendments, this waiting time may be further shortened to six years, through 
the demonstration of  “ special integration efforts ” ( besonderer Integrationsleistungen ), 
especially as concerns knowledge of the German language. 63 Indeed, one of the main 
novelties of these amendments was the introduction of concrete language and inte-
gration requirements for most new nationals. 64 Sufﬁ cient knowledge of both written 
and spoken German must now be demonstrated, chieﬂ y with a German Certiﬁ cate. 65 
Since 2008, a standardized citizenship test is required to verify  “ knowledge of the legal 
and social order under living conditions in Germany. ” 66 In addition, a citizenship oath 
( feierliches Bekenntnis ) is now to be administered to all new nationals in the context of 
a citizenship ceremony. 67 
 The novelty of these provisions is twofold. In the ﬁ rst place, they underline the 
fact that integration, already one of the main goals of the 1999 StAG reforms, has 
become a guiding principle of the German approach to membership. 68 Second, these 
developments are analogous to similar provisions in the United Kingdom, France, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands, to give but a few examples, all of which have in recent 
years introduced language and/or integration tests as well as loyalty or citizenship 
oaths and, in some cases, citizenship ceremonies. 69 In fact, the outlines of a European 
 63  StAG § 7(10)(3). 
 64  Id. § 10(1)(6) and (7). The elderly, sick, and handicapped are exempt from these language and integra-
tion requirements.  Id. § 10(6). Those who can prove knowledge of German norms and lifestyle in some 
other manner, including through school diplomas, are also exempt from integration requirements.  See 
Sturm,  supra note 34 , at 134. 
 65  StAG § 10(4). 
 66  “ Kentnisse der Rechts- und Gesellschaftsordnung unter der Lebensverhältnisse in Deutschland. ”  Id. § 
10(5). A regulation sets out uniform guidelines for the integration courses and tests. Verordnung zu 
Einbürgerungstest und Einbürgerungskurs, Aug. 5, 2008, BGBl. I at 1649. 
 67  StAG § 16. 
 68  This is not to say that all parties agree on the scope and breadth of the expected integration, however.  See 
H ORVÁTH ,  supra note 3 , at 256 et seq. 
 69  See id. at 290 et seq.; Christian Joppke,  Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and 
Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France and Germany , 59 W ORLD P OL . 243 (2007). 
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Union approach to civic integration have already emerged with the Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union — aimed at for-
eigners from outside the European Union — which was accepted as part of the Hague 
Programme in 2004; 70 more recently, we have seen the issuance of Handbooks on 
Integration. 71 
 Interesting, from our perspective, is the fact that whereas the nationals of EU mem-
ber states now enjoy most of the prerogatives of citizens (including a more secure 
residential status and local voting rights) without having to naturalize and hence to 
 “ Germanize, ” this is not true of third-country nationals. At the same time, the fact 
that Germany is now just one more European country joining the trend of enhanc-
ing  “ cultural integration ” requirements frees it from the potential accusation that this 
policy is inevitably reﬂ ective of Germany’s persistent strand of ethnocultural member-
ship. Indeed, strictly speaking, cultural integration requirements, such as the need to 
learn the ofﬁ cial language(s) of the polity or to familiarize oneself with the institutions 
of a certain country, can be justiﬁ ed on the basis of civic conceptions of citizenship. 
For example, the requirements may mirror a concern with the health of democratic 
society, including that of a citizenry which has the linguistic capacity to become well-
informed, to participate in the democratic process, and to enjoy the full rights and 
opportunities society has to offer on an equal basis. 72 Ironically though, what does not 
squarely fall within such a civic conception of citizenship is the two-tier membership 
approach that seems to be gradually consolidating along a divide between EU and 
third-country nationals. 
 4.  Attendant rights and obligations 
 While the modiﬁ cation of access to full membership in the German  Staatsvolk continues 
to be guided, for the most part, by the traditional national citizenship model, the need 
to respond to the legal requirements of European integration — rather than an evolu-
tion of existing norms — has directed the changing nature of the rights and obliga-
tions entailed by citizenship in recent years. Indeed, the gradual consolidation of a 
form of European membership has acted as an engine of change in the context of the 
rights and obligations traditionally conceived of as elements in the core deﬁ nition of 
German national citizenship, often despite considerable opposition. This evolu-
tion may best be assessed by taking a look at the two rights that have embodied the 
 70  See Council Press Release of 2618th Council Meeting 14615/04 (Presse 321) (Nov. 19, 2004) at 15 
et seq. The program constitutes an action plan launched by the European Commission, with detailed 
proposals for EU action on, inter alia, migration, visa policies, asylum, privacy and security, and the ﬁ ght 
against organised crime and terrorism. 
 71  See also Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee on the Regions, A Common Agenda for Integration: Framework for the 
Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union , COM (2005) 389 ﬁ nal; Martin A. Schain,  The 
State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union , 20 E UR . J. I NT’L L. 93, 104 et seq. (2009). 
 72  See Ruth Rubio-Marín,  Language Rights: Exploring the Competing Rationales ,  in L ANGUAGE R IGHTS AND 
P OLITICAL T HEORY 52 – 80 (Will Kymlicka & Alan Patten eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
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bastions of national citizenship in Germany and elsewhere: voting rights and full resi-
dential stability or, more speciﬁ cally, the right of nationals to remain in their state of 
nationality. 
 4.1.  Voting rights 
 As the FCC noted in a recent decision on the constitutionality of Germany’s ratiﬁ cation 
of the Lisbon treaty and of accompanying legislation,  “ the right to vote substantiates 
a claim to democratic self-determination, to free and equal participation in the state 
power exercised in Germany, as well as to the observance of the precept of democ-
racy, including respect for the constitutional power of the people. ” 73 Article 38(1) of 
the Basic Law, which establishes that the members of the Bundestag are to be elected 
through direct, free, and secret elections, anchors this right in the view of the Court. 74 
Democratic legitimacy thus requires that every national be entitled to an equal share 
in the exercise of sovereignty through participation in parliamentary elections. 75 
 Conversely, the FCC has held that voting rights of any kind for non-nationals are 
incompatible with this approach, since such individuals are not full members of the 
sovereign German people. 76 This position does not mean, however, that the issue of 
whether or not permanent residents are included in the demos is irrelevant. In fact, 
the Court agrees that as a matter of democratic legitimacy, those who are perma-
nently subject to state power should also have a say in political matters. In the view 
of the FCC, it is the access of permanent residents to German nationality — and hence 
Germany citizenship — that should be facilitated, however, not alternate forms of par-
ticipation. 77 Thus, once again, the possibility of reforming the nationality law presents 
a safety valve, which allows external realities, such as mass migration, to loosen the 
bounds of national citizenship without displacing the centrality of the national citizen-
ship model itself. Indeed, as already noted, the 1999 reform of the nationality law was 
aimed at facilitating access to German nationality for second- and third-generation 
migrants precisely to address the democratic legitimacy gap created by a large popula-
tion of permanent residents without voting rights. 
 In 2005, the Court reiterated its strict stance on voting for non-nationals. At stake 
was the issue of whether to allow individuals whose German nationality had been 
revoked to vote in the 2005 elections, given that they had challenged the revocation of 
their nationality on constitutional grounds and the decision was still pending. In effect, 
 73  “ Das Wahlrecht begründet einen Anspruch auf demokratische Selbstbestimmung, auf freie und gleiche 
Teilhabe an der in Deutschland ausgeübten Staatsgewalt sowie auf die Einhaltung des Demoktariegebots 
einschließlich der Achtung der verfassungsgebenden Gewalt des Volkes. ” BVerfG June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 
2/08, para. 208. 
 74  Id. at para. 208 – 210. 
 75  BVerfGE 112, 118. 
 76  On the basis of this reasoning, in 1989 and 1990 the FCC struck down legislation enacted by Schleswig-
Holstein and Hamburg conferring on permanent residents the right to vote and to run for ofﬁ ce in local 
elections.  See BVerfGE 83, 37 and BVerfGE 83, 60.  See also R UBIO -M ARÍN ,  supra note 22, at 203 – 204. 
 77  BVerfGE 83, 37 (51, 53); BVerfGE 83, 60 (71). 
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the FCC was forced to undertake a balancing exercise between the drawbacks of two 
possible outcomes in this case: denial of a national’s right to vote, on the one hand, and 
the danger of an irregularity in the elections if the individuals were allowed to vote and 
later found not to be nationals. The Court determined that, on balance, the drawbacks 
of both outcomes were equal, and, accordingly, allowed the revocation of nationality — 
and the consequent lack of a right to vote — to stand until its constitutionality had 
been determined. 78 In essence, then, the threat that a non-national would be allowed 
to vote in national elections outweighed the (possibly non-national) individual’s right 
to participate in — and thereby, perhaps, undermine — the democratic process. 
 Despite such concerns, one explicit exception to the principle that non-nationals 
have no voting rights was introduced into the Basic Law in 1992, in the context of 
Germany’s accession to the Treaty on European Union, allowing for municipal voting 
rights for Union citizens (in GG art. 28[1]). 79 Thus, as in the context of approaches to 
multiple nationality, Union citizens form an exception to the general rule. The fact 
that this exception now has constitutional grounding should probably lead to the 
conclusion that the foundation has been laid for a supplementary conception of politi-
cal membership, namely, that of Union citizenship, coexistent with that of German 
national citizenship. This notion of European membership is clearly not an ethnic one, 
nor is it simply inspired by civic understandings of citizenship. Rather, it is one that 
shares with the notion of national citizenship the delimitation of a predeﬁ ned politi-
cal entity but shifts its boundaries from the national to the European level. Indeed, 
from a purely democratic angle, it raises certain tensions, since it calls for a justiﬁ ca-
tion of why some long-term residents may have a political say in community matters, 
whereas others remain disempowered in local affairs. 
 4.2.  The right to remain in the state of nationality 
 Voting rights are not the only aspect of national citizenship that the process of Euro-
pean integration has altered. Pursuant to the introduction of the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW) in 2002, Union citizens must now be surrendered by their member 
state of nationality to another member state for any of the offenses covered by the 
EAW Framework Decision, 80 with only few exceptions. Though a number of conven-
tions relating to extradition had been in place among member states before the intro-
duction of the EAW, the new practice (in effect as of January 1, 2004), based on the 
 78  BVerfG Sept. 2, 2005, 2 BvQ 25/05, para. 13. 
 79  GG art. 28(1) now provides that, as far as county and communal elections are concerned, the nationals 
of other EU member states are eligible to both vote and be elected. 
 80  These include, inter alia, murder or grievous bodily injury, rape, kidnapping, organized or armed rob-
bery, racketeering or extortion, arson, trafﬁ cking in human beings, weapons, drugs, cultural goods or 
stolen vehicles, environmental crimes, computer-related crimes, fraud affecting certain ﬁ nancial interests, 
and racism or xenophobia.  See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of June 13, 2002, On the 
European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States, 2002 O.J. (L 190/1). 
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principle of  “ mutual recognition, ” has limited the grounds for a refusal to surrender 
to certain itemized reasons of an administrative and judicial nature, independent of 
traditional sovereignty concerns. In fact, only the preamble of the framework deci-
sion makes any reference to the application of the  “ constitutional rules ” of member 
states — many of which prohibit the extradition of nationals — and curtails these to a 
very limited area. 81 As such, the EAW has profoundly changed the legal framework 
for extraditions between EU member states. 
 Several domestic courts, including the FCC, 82 have examined the constitutionality 
of the legislation implementing the EAW. In a decision widely criticized by scholars, 83 
a majority of the Court found the German legislation implementing the EAW uncon-
stitutional for two reasons; ﬁ rst, because it did not allow for recourse to a court against 
a grant of extradition, contrary to the requirement of GG article 19(4), 84 and, second, 
because it did not comply with the prerequisites of a qualiﬁ ed proviso of legality under 
GG article 16(2). This article had been amended in 2000 to establish a derogation 
from the general prohibition on the extradition of nationals to allow for surrender to 
an EU member state or international court. 85 
 As an initial presumption, the Court noted citizens ’  “ special association to the legal 
system that is established by them, ” 86 and from which citizens may, in principle, not 
be excluded. This constitutionally sanctiﬁ ed connection may be limited on the basis of 
the recently introduced article 16(2) of the Basic Law — which allows for extradition 
to other EU member states or international courts — but only to the extent that it does 
not result in a loss of the core elements of statehood ( Entstaatlichung ) 87 and, as regards 
individual rights, only  “ as long as the rule of law [and in particular the principle of 
proportionality] is upheld. ” 88 The Basic Law thus requires that there be no dispropor-
tionate restriction of the constitutional right to freedom from extradition and that a 
threefold distinction be made for the purpose of assessing an instance of extradition: in 
the context of criminal acts with a signiﬁ cant domestic link, there may be no extradi-
tion; when a signiﬁ cant connecting factor to another EU member state exists, extradi-
tion is possible; ﬁ nally, a case-by-case assessment is necessary if a crime has been com-
 81  Id . at recital 12 ( “ This Framework Decision does not prevent a Member State from applying its constitu-
tional rules relating to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression 
in other media ” ). 
 82  BVerfG July 18, 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04. The Czech, Polish and Cypriot constitutional courts also exam-
ined the respective national laws implementing the EAW. 
 83  See Simone Mölders,  European Arrest Warrant is Void  – The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court of 18 July 2005 , 7 G ERMAN L.J. 45 – 46 n.6 (2006),  available at  http :// www . germanlawjournal . com / 
past_issues_archive . php . 
 84  BVerfG July 18, 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04, para. 63, 102. (English translation from FCC website,  available at 
 http :// www . bundesverfassungsgericht . de / entscheidungen / rs20050718_2bvr223604en . html ). 
 85  Prior to the amendment, GG art. 16(2) simply prohibited the extradition of Germans. Now the provision 
allows for extradition to another EU member state or international court on the basis of a statutory excep-
tion, so long as rule-of-law guarantees are respected. 
 86  BVerfG July 18, 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04, para. 66. 
 87  Id. at para. 75. 
 88  Id. at para. 78. 
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mitted in Germany but its  “ result ” occurs abroad. 89 In all cases, a speciﬁ c examination 
is required as to whether the prosecuted person’s rights are guaranteed. 90 In addition, 
the surrender of a German may be allowed only if the EU member state undertakes to 
return the individual after the imposition of a ﬁ nal sentence. 91 Until the adoption of a 
new implementing law that took account of these prerequisites, the Court determined 
that no extradition of a German national could take place under the EAW mecha-
nism. 92 
 As a ﬁ nal matter, the FCC also noted why the principles set out in article 6(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union 93 do not provide adequate protection for individuals: 
 The mere existence of this provision [TEU art. 6], of a mechanism for imposing sanctions that 
secures the structural principles [TEU art. 7] and the existence of an all-European standard of 
human rights protection established by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms do not, however, justify the assumption that the rule-of-law structures are 
synchronized between the Member States of the European Union as regards substantive law 
and that a corresponding examination at the national level on a case-by-case basis is therefore 
superﬂ uous. In this respect, putting into effect a strict principle of mutual recognition, and the 
extensive statement of mutual conﬁ dence among the states that is connected with it, cannot 
restrict the constitutional guarantee of the fundamental rights. 94 
In other words, in the opinion of the FCC, while a clear Union objective may exist and 
be furthered by the existence of the EAW, this circumstance does not justify, from 
the perspective of the individual, a displacement of the constitutional rights under the 
Basic Law. 95 While the Court’s decision may have raised signiﬁ cant questions about 
the principle of  “ mutual trust ” that underlies much of the European Union’s third-pillar 
activities, it is worth remembering that the EAW procedure itself was not declared 
unconstitutional, so that, as a practical matter, the traditional prohibition on the 
removal of Germans from the territory of Germany and transfer to a foreign jurisdiction 
 89  Id. at para. 85 – 88. 
 90  Id. at para. 89. 
 91  Id. at para. 91, 100, 101. 
 92  Id. at para. 117, 124. 
 93  “ The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. ” Consolidated Ver-
sion of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(1), Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321E/5) [hereinafter TEU 
(Consolidated Version)]. 
 94  BVerfG July 18, 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04, para. 119. 
 95  The Opinion of Advocate General Colomer in Case C-303/05 (a reference from the Belgian Constitutional 
Court, then still called the Court of Arbitration, for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the Framework 
Decision) painted a very different picture of European integration. The Opinion — from the distinction made 
between  “ extradition ” and the EAW to its consideration from a fundamental rights perspective — relied in 
large part on the actuality of a  “ high level of conﬁ dence, ”  “ mutual trust, ” and a  “ common interest ” among 
member states. In the words of the Opinion,  “ the aim is to provide assistance to someone with whom one 
shares principles, values and objectives, through the creation of an institutional framework with its own 
special sources of law which vary in force but which ultimately are binding and which seek to prevent and 
combat crime in a single area of freedom, security and justice [ . . . ]. ” Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer in Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad (Sept. 12, 2006). 
 See Daniel Sarmiento,  European Union: The European Arrest Warrant and the Quest for Constitutional Coherence , 
6 I NT’L . J. C ONST . L. (I • CON) 171 (2008). 
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has undergone a signiﬁ cant transformation when it comes to EU member states. Once 
again, the European exception, discussed above, can be glimpsed, although it now 
results in what is arguably a restriction in the scope of citizenship rights. 
 In conclusion, then, we are witness to another instance of constitutional reform, in 
particular, another instance of a constitutional grounding for European membership 
even though such an approach implies the restriction of a right traditionally associ-
ated with German national citizenship. The FCC oversees this evolution to ensure that 
the emergence of a concept of European membership does not result in a wholesale 
erosion of the status of national membership and the rights traditionally associated 
with it, however. 
 5.  Conclusion 
 Recent years have brought about no signiﬁ cant evolution in the German constitu-
tional conception of citizenship, which owes much to the national citizenship model, 
and continues to function as the linchpin of German sovereignty. That said, various 
domestic developments, including the permanent presence of several generations 
of migrants in Germany, have been acknowledged in the framework of the exist-
ing model. This has occurred thanks to a constitutional remission to the legisla-
tor’s revision of the nationality law, and despite a sometimes incongruous outcome. 
Conversely, external developments, especially European integration, have led to the 
appearance of a European exception with regard both to stipulations on access to 
German nationality and to certain rights associated with citizenship, marking the 
beginning of what may well evolve into a considerable transformation. 
 The extent to which European membership will be able to replace the central notion 
of national citizenship as a predominant concept is unclear, however. As demon-
strated by the FCC’s recent decision on the constitutionality of Germany’s ratiﬁ cation 
of the Lisbon treaty, the constitutional conception of national citizenship continues 
to deﬁ ne the contours of any evolution. Thus, although the FCC determined that no 
constitutional constraints stood in the path of ratiﬁ cation of the treaty 96 (with certain 
caveats, especially in the context of accompanying national legislation), 97 the ruling 
read more like a somewhat verbose and muddled attempt to set precise boundaries for 
European integration in the tradition of the  Maastricht decision 98 than as an enthusi-
astic welcome. 
 96  BVerfG June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 273 et seq. 
 97  Id. at para. 406 et seq. 
 98  BVerfGE 89, 155 (Maastricht) (determining that any European-level action or decision that exceeded the 
constitutional threshold for the transfer of sovereignty would be  ultra vires and inapplicable in Germany, 
effectively rendering the FCC the ﬁ nal arbiter of national sovereignty, and reasserting that any encroach-
ment of constitutional signiﬁ cance by European law on fundamental rights would be reviewed by the 
FCC to the extent the ECJ did not provide sufﬁ cient protection). 
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 In its judgment, the Court reafﬁ rmed that although Germany’s constitutional 
arrangements allow it to pursue the aim of inserting itself into an international and 
European framework 99 by means of the creation of a  “ new form of political authority, ” 100 
such an authorization does not allow for the abandonment of the right of the German 
people to self-determination. 101 As a general guiding principle then, the process of 
the European Union may neither hollow out the existing German democratic system 
nor assume for itself fundamental democratic requirements. 102 For this reason, the 
European Union may still only be viewed as a union of sovereign states,  “ in which 
the constituent peoples — in other words the national citizens — of the member states 
remain the subjects of democratic legitimation. ” 103 The principle of conferral and 
the requirement to maintain the national identities of the member states, which are 
inherent in their fundamental structures, both political and constitutional, 104 are, in 
this context, an expression of the constitutional foundations for Union power. 105 
 The FCC also noted that the European Union cannot be compared to a state in view 
of the organization of its tasks and power; rather, it remains an entity subject to the 
will of the member states. 106 It follows that the European Parliament is (still) not an 
organ representative of a sovereign European people but rather a forum to represent 
the people of the member states. 107 No self-standing sovereignty ﬂ ows from the total-
ity of Union citizens. 108 Given these circumstances, the European Union should not be 
considered an entity analogous to states nor be measured by the democratic require-
ments applicable to states; it is, instead, free to develop its own forms of democratic 
supplementation, without regard for the principles (for example,  “ one man, one vote ” ) 
on which state-centered conceptions are based. 109 
 In addition, while the integration process may open up possibilities for new forms 
of participation, the requirements of democratic legitimacy within the member states 
continue to set boundaries for this process to the extent that Union citizens are no 
 99  “ die grundgesetzliche Ausgestaltung des Demokratieprinzips ist offen für das Ziel, Deutschland in eine 
internationale und europäische Friedensordnung einzufügen. ” BVerfG June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 
219.  See also , GG art. 23(1). 
 100  “ neue Gestalt politischer Herrschaft. ”  Id. The  “ inalienable constitutional identity ” ( “ unverfügbare [ ] 
Verfassungsidentität ” ) circumscribed in GG art. 79(3) establishes the far borders of such development, 
however. 
 101  “ das Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Deutschen Volkes in Gestalt der völkerrechtlicehn Souveränität 
Deutschlands aufzugeben. ”  Id . at para. 228. 
 102  Id. at para. 244. 
 103  “ in der die Völker  – das heißt die staatsangehörigen Bürger  – der Mitgliedstaaten die Subjekte demokra-
tischer Legitimation bleiben. ”  Id. at para. 229. 
 104  Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 5, Mar. 25, 1957, 2006 
O.J. (C 321E/37); TEU (Consolidated Version) art. 6(3). 
 105  BVerfG June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 234, 239, 272. 
 106  Id. at para. 231, 278, 298. 
 107  Id. at para. 279 – 281, 284, 286. European elections, accordingly, are only a supplementary possibility of 
political participation for the nationals of member states.  Id. at para. 274, 277. 
 108  Id. at para. 281, 346. Compare BVerfGE 89, 155 (188). 
 109  BVerfG June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 282. 
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longer able to orient themselves in the new web of competencies. 110 As a matter of 
democratic self-determination, then, the Court declared that European integration 
must not endanger the capacity of member states to make their own political arrange-
ments for certain economic, cultural, and social matters, including citizenship; to 
make decisions that could interfere with constitutional rights (especially in the context 
of criminal law); to maintain the state monopoly on civil and military power; to make 
basic ﬁ scal decisions about state income and expenses; or to make decisions about the 
welfare state, as well as on cultural matters, including language use, educational and 
family matters, on freedom of thought, press or assembly, or on dealings with religious 
denominations. 111 
 Finally, the Court also repeated that the Basic Law sets clear limits on the kinds 
of sovereign rights state organs may transfer to the European Union and underlined 
that the Union may not become a subject of legitimation independent of its member 
states. 112 As already set out in the  Solange 113 and  Maastricht decisions, the FCC will 
continue to police such constitutional limits to integration. 114 In the context of citizen-
ship, in particular, the derivative character of Union citizenship and the maintenance 
of member state nationality establish the outer boundary for the evolution of that 
citizenship status within European law. 115 
 To the extent European integration is to continue as a political and social enterprise 
(in addition to an internal market-driven one) such a clear instance of boundary set-
ting by a constitutional court raises larger questions. Certainly, the German example 
demonstrates that the boundaries of the national community — and the concomitant 
role of national citizenship — are slowly being stretched by European integration. 
Certain rights (such as voting in municipal elections) are extended to Union citizens 
despite a general ban on the practice, while the territory of the EU is increasingly the 
container in which fundamental rights are to be protected (despite the attempts of 
the FCC to remain in the national box). Simultaneously, access to nationality is made 
easier for Union citizens, even at the price of disregarding long-held principles, such as 
avoidance of multiple nationality. 
 Despite such changes, however, it does not seem that the function of citizenship 
has undergone any signiﬁ cant transformation, at least in Germany. This poses a 
clear conundrum for the future evolution of Union citizenship. Are member states 
willing to leave behind conceptions of citizenship grounded in a state-centered view 
 110  Id. at para. 247. 
 111  Id. at para. 249, 252. 
 112  Id. at para. 232 – 233, 238 – 239. 
 113  BVerfGE 37, 271 (Solange I) (determining that within the framework of the Basic Law and in light of the 
current stage of European integration, only the FCC was entitled to protect fundamental rights, with the 
practical result that the Court could review European law); BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange II) (determining 
that as long as the European Communities generally provided effective protection for fundamental rights, 
the Court would no longer review European law for conformity with the fundamental rights contained in 
the Basic Law). 
 114  BVerfG June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 240, 340. 
 115  Id. at para. 350. 
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of sovereignty? For example, would Germany extend the European exception that has 
crept into its conception of national citizenship to encompass general voting rights for 
Union citizens, as the European Commission has repeatedly alluded to? 116 Or could the 
existing approach, which leaves nationality matters to member state competence, be 
abandoned in favor of basic common principles on the acquisition and loss of mem-
ber state nationality? And even if the political will to undertake such reforms existed, 
would the defense of the traditional role of national citizenship in member states, par-
ticularly as construed by constitutional courts, form a barrier to the transformation 
of approaches to membership within the European Union? It is at this constitutional 
juncture that future conceptions of citizenship, both in the EU and at the member state 
level, are likely to be negotiated. 
 116  See Report from the Commission, Fourth Report on Citizenship of the Union, at §§ 3(3) and 5, COM 
(2004) 695 ﬁ nal (Oct. 26, 2004); Report from the Commission, Fifth Report on Citizenship of the Union, 
at § 4(4), COM (2008) 85 ﬁ nal (Feb. 15, 2008). 
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